The genetics or genomic revolution, embodied in the Human Genome Project (HGP), is a scientific undertaking of unprecedented proportions. Francis Collins, director of the HGP, judges it "the single most important project in biology and the biomedical sciences" (Collins et al. 1998:682) . Its champions have high expectations for the benefits of the HGP, predicting that it will "revolutionize the practice of medicine in the twenty-first century by providing the tools to determine the hereditary component of virtually all diseases" (Collins and Mansoura 2001:221) .
Because the HGP represents a purposeful social action on a grand scale, we may expect its unanticipated social consequences (Merton 1936 ) to be significant as well. One subtle but potentially powerful consequence is "geneticization," that is, the ascendancy of genetics as a basis for understanding human beings and human behavior (Lippman 1991) . Just as the Darwinian and Freudian revolutions changed the way we view ourselves as human beings, the genetics revolution is likely to influence the way we understand the causes of human behavior and the power of the social environment to shape it (Krimsky 1991 
GENETICIZATION OF DEVIANCE
Conrad and Schneider (1992) argued that the increasing power and prestige of medicine in the twentieth century led to the medicalization of deviance, resulting in the redefinition of many forms of stigmatized behavior'-such as mental illness, alcoholism, and criminality-from moral to medical problems. There can be little doubt that a parallel process of geneticization is under way.2 The HGP's prestige and influence are attested to not only by huge monetary investments in genomic research but also by official governmental endorsement and widespread positive publicity about the HGP and genomic research in the mass media (Conrad 2001) . Genetic definitions and interpretations are also making their way into wider cultural arenas, including policy debates, fictional works, and advertisements (Kitcher 1996 Although stigma is regularly described by scholars as being historically specific, it is just as regularly studied in static social circumstances. The genetics revolution gives sociologists the opportunity to directly study the impact of a major cultural and social change on existing states of stigma. Very different visions have been offered as to what this impact might be. On the one hand are hopes that genetic interpretations will reduce stigma by eliminating blame. On the other are fears that entirely new labels and forms of stigma may develop (e.g., "carrier" or "high risk") and that genetic information will provide new mechanisms of discrimination ( To understand how the face of stigma may change in an increasingly geneticized society, concepts about stigma need to be integrated with theory and concepts relating to causal attributions. Two sets of ideas are particularly relevant. Attribution theory (Corrigan 2000; Weiner 1986 Weiner , 1995 leads to optimistic predictions about the impact of geneticization on stigma. Another set of ideas relating to "genetic essentialism" (Lippman 1992 ; Nelkin and Lindee 1995) lead to pessimistic predictions.
Attribution Theory
The destigmatizing potential of geneticization is prominent in the arguments of activist groups such as the National Alliance for the Mentally Ill, as well as some gay rights activists (Conrad 1997; Johnson 1989; Whisman 1996) . These arguments are based on the principle that genetic and other biological explanations of stigmatized behaviors reduce blame. For example, consider the following passage from the web site of one prominent activist organization: "A 'mental illness' is not caused by bad parenting and is not a character weakness ... These illnesses are due to biochemical disturbances in the brain ... The shame and fear once associated with cancer has largely been dispelled by accurate information and understanding. The same will happen for brain diseases-mental illnesses-once the facts are known" (National Alliance for the Mentally Ill Oregon 1997).
Attribution theory (Weiner 1986 (Weiner , 1995 
Genetic Essentialism
Several authors have argued that "genetic essentialist" thinking is on the rise (Lippman 1992; Nelkin and Lindee 1995).4 In a genetic essentialist view, genes form the basis of our human and individual identities (i.e., "we are our genes") and are strongly deterministic of behavior, so that if one has genes associated with some behavior, that behavior will definitely occur and " is fixed and unchangeable" (Alper and Beckwith 1993:511). According to James Watson, "our fate is in our genes" (quoted in Jaroff 1989).
A genetic essentialist viewpoint suggests that genetic characteristics are irrevocably, or at least very firmly, attached to an individual and, by extension, to those with whom the person shares genes. Consideration of positively valued characteristics such as beauty or intelligence make it clear that genetic essentialism is not inherently stigmatizing. However, when applied to negatively valued qualities, genetic essentialism should exacerbate stigma via its influence on several perceptions: (1) that the person is fundamentally different from others, (2) that the problem is persistent and serious, and (3) that the problem is likely to occur in other family members. These perceptions in turn should increase behavioral orientations of social distance and reproductive restrictions.
Differentness. If a stigmatized characteristic is perceived to be genetic and genes are viewed as the basis of personal identity, the stigmatized person may be seen as more fundamentally different ("them") from others ("us").
Persistence. Once a person has been "marked" with a stigmatizing label, the label is difficult to shed (Jones et al. 1984) . Genetic essentialism should exacerbate this problem. If the stigmatized behavior is "in your genes" and your genes are seen as the essence of you as a person, then optimism for full and permanent "recovery" from the deviant status may be further reduced.5
Risk to family members and associative stigma. Evidence suggests that family members of stigmatized individuals suffer "associative" (Mehta and Farina 1988) 
The Two Theories
Attribution theory predicts that geneticization will reduce stigma, while genetic essentialism predicts that stigma will be exacerbated. However, different outcomes are implied by the two theories. Attribution theory predicts stigma reduction via reduced blame, anger, and punishment and increased sympathy and helping. Genetic essentialism predicts stigma magnification via increased perceptions of differentness, and-indirectly through increased perceptions of seriousness, persistence, and risk to family members-via increased social distance and reproductive restriction. It is possible that both theories are correct and operate simultaneously. It is also possible that geneticization will have little effect on stigma. This would be the case if perceptions of the stigmatized behavior itself (e.g., fear of violence by people with mental illness or aversion to sexually deviant acts) are the primary determinant of stigmatizing responses rather than beliefs about its causes. Comparison with the Census. To evaluate sample selection bias, I compared the weighted analysis sample with 2000 Census data for gender, educational attainment, household income, and age (see Table 1 ).6 Correspondence with the Census is good in terms of age, but the sample overrepresents women and people with higher socioeconomic status (SES). To assess the possibility that sampling biases affected the findings, results will be examined for their generality across gender, SES, age, and ethnicity.
RESEARCH STRATEGY
Weighting. Results are weighted to account for poststratification adjustment to national counts by race/ethnicity and differential selection probabilities based on race/ethnicity and family history of psychiatric hospitalization. To calculate statistical tests, I used Sudaan (Research Triangle Institute 2001), which estimates standard errors for complex survey designs.
The Vignettes
All 1,241 respondents participated in one of two vignette experiments; 641 were randomly assigned to the experiment analyzed in this article. In the vignette descriptions, the following information was randomly varied: whether the vignette described a person with schizophrenia (N = 307), major depressive disorder (N = 301), or ruptured disk (N = 33);7 the vignette subject's gender and SES; and cause of the illness. The vignette subject's race/ethnicity was matched to the respondent's, and appropriate names were selected for each ethnic group. Below is one version of the vignette; ital- Three versions of the causal attribution statement were presented. However, the three levels were not monotonically related to most outcome variables, precluding treating causal attribution as a continuous measure. Mean levels of the outcome variables were more similar for respondents who heard the genetic and partly genetic versions than for those who heard the nongenetic version. Given these facts, I 
Manipulation Checks
At the end of the interview, recall was assessed by asking respondents whether the genetics expert said Anne's problems were "strongly," "partly," or "not due to genetic or hereditary factors" and agreement by asking, "Do you accept what the expert said-that is, do you agree that what the expert said about the cause of the problem could be correct?" Because I am interested in the effects of believing a mental illness is genetically influenced, I limit the results to respondents who recalled the expert's statement correctly and who "strongly" or "somewhat" agreed with the statement. Of the 608 respondents assigned to the schizophrenia or major depression vignettes, 182 were eliminated on the basis of recall and agreement, leaving a final sample of 426 for the main analyses (212 for schizophrenia; 214 for depression).8
RESULTS

Are Mental Illnesses Stigmatized?
Before turning to the main findings concerning geneticization and stigma, I address a more basic question: Is there evidence in the present data for negative attitudes toward mental illness? To address this question, I compared social distance for vignettes describing the two mental illnesses and a presumably nonstigmatized problem, ruptured disk. The reason for this comparison is that, unless expressed attitudes are extremely negative, the use of a comparison point may be the only way of judging whether stigma is present. For example, if 60 percent of people express willingness to be friends with a person who has been hospitalized for schizophrenia, it is difficult to say whether this indicates social rejection unless we know how many would be willing to be friends with a similar person without schizophrenia. Table 2 shows that significantly less social distance was desired from the vignette subject with a ruptured disk than from either of the vignette subjects with a mental illness.
Geneticization and Stigma
My main goal is to evaluate the effect of geneticization on the stigma associated with mental illnesses, and the remaining analyses are based on the schizophrenia and major depression vignettes only. Because of the use of multiple dependent measures and consequent concerns about Type I error, I first conducted multivariate tests to evaluate whether genetic attribution significantly affects the attribution theory outcomes as a set and the genetic essentialism outcomes as a set. I then regressed each individual outcome measure on genetic attribution, controlling for vignette disorder (schizophrenia vs. depression); respondent gender; age; education;family income; race/ethnicity; political conservatism; perceived importance ofgenetics; and eugenic concerns. To evaluate the generality of the effects of genetic attribution, I assessed its interaction with each of the covariates. Interaction terms were retained only if the interaction terms as a set significantly increased R-squared (p < .05) and the coefficient for the individual interaction term was significant (p < .05). Table 3 reports unstandardized coefficients for genetic attribution after all control variables and significant interaction terms were entered. Both sets of hypotheses predict that geneticization influences cognitive and emotional factors that in turn affect behavior. Therefore, for all behavioral orientation outcomes (i.e., help, punishment, social distance, and reproductive restriction) that were significantly influenced by genetic attribution, Table 4 presents a series of multiple regression models in which the mediating role of theoretically relevant cognitive and emotional factors is assessed by adding them to the Table 3 equations.
Attribution theory. Attribution theory predicts that blame, anger, and punishment should be decreased by genetic attribution and that sympathy and help should be increased. A multivariate test indicated that genetic attribution was not significantly related to these dependent variables when considered as a set. Considered individually, panel A of Table 3 shows that genetic attribution significantly affected only one dependent measure: It decreased punishment (p < .05), as predicted by attribution theory.9 Not surprisingly, given these findings, panel A of Table  4 shows that the impact of genetic attribution on punishment was not significantly mediated by the attribution model attitudes and emotions.
Genetic essentialism. Based on ideas about genetic essentialism, I predicted that genetic attribution would increase the perceived differentness of the individual, persistence and seriousness of the problem, and risk that the person's child and sibling would develop a similar problem. I also hypothesized that, because of its impact on these beliefs, genetic attribution would increase social distance from the vignette subject, social distance from the sibling, and reproductive restriction. The multivariate test showed that genetic attribution was significantly associated with these outcomes as a set (Wald F-statistic; p < .001).10
Beliefs. Panel B of Table 3 shows that genetic attribution affected all these beliefs in the predicted direction and that all but one association (perceived differentness) was statistically significant. Perceived seriousness (p < .01), perceived persistence (p < .05), perceived risk to sibling (p < .01), and perceived risk to child (p < .001) were all increased.11
Behavioral orientations. I have argued that, to the extent that genetic essentialist views prevail, genetic attributions should increase the desire for social distance and reproductive restriction. Panel C of Table 3 shows that genetic attribution had no significant impact on social distance from the vignette subject or on reproductive restriction. However, it did increase social distance from the sibling (p < .05). Genetic essentialism also suggests that, because of the fear of genetic contamination, genetic attributions should affect intimate social distance more strongly than casual social distance. Therefore, I repeated the analyses with these two subscales. Genetic attribution had a small A genetic essentialist view predicts that the significant increase in intimate social distance from the sibling should at least in part be explained by beliefs that the problem is more serious and persistent, the person is more different, and the sibling and child are at greater risk of developing a similar problem. Panel B of Table 4 shows that this was so. When these beliefs were added to the model, the coefficient for genetic attribution was reduced by 20 percent and lost statistical significance.
DISCUSSION
This article addresses one potential social ramification of the genetics revolution-the impact that geneticization of deviant behavior may have on stigma. I used attribution theory and ideas about genetic essentialism to derive contrasting predictions about the consequences of geneticization for stigma. Attribution theory suggests that when the cause of a stigmatized behavior is viewed as being out of the individual's control (as is the case with genetic causes) the individual is seen as blameless and thus elicits more positive emotions and behavior. On the pessimistic side is the idea of genetic essentialism, according to which genetic factors are increasingly viewed as the basis of an individual's identity and as strongly deterministic of behavior. Genetic essentialism implies that geneticized deviance should be viewed as more serious, less likely to change, and more likely to appear in biological relatives and should make the stigmatized person seem more fundamentally different from others. In turn, these perceptions should worsen stigma outcomes of social rejection and reproductive restriction.
I tested these predictions using the example of mental illness and a vignette experiment embedded in a large national survey. I experimentally manipulated whether schizophrenia or major depression was attributed to genetic factors and measured a broad array of outcomes related to the two sets of hypotheses.
Support was weak for hypotheses based on attribution theory. Genetic attribution was not significantly related to the hypothesized outcomes (blame, sympathy, anger, helping, and punishing) as a set. Considered individually, only one prediction was supported: When mental illness was attributed to genetic causes, respondents were more likely to endorse leniency in how the police and courts should deal with the person if he or she did something violent as a result of his or her problem. It is important to note that the relatively weak support for these predictions does not negate the validity of attribution theory per se. The findings do, however, question the optimistic implications of the theory that genetic explanations for deviant behaviors will reduce stigma.
Support was stronger for predictions based on genetic essentialism. Genetic attribution was significantly related to the hypothesized outcomes as a set (p < .001). Except for perceived differentness, each of the beliefs implied by genetic essentialism was increased by genetic attribution, most at the .01 or .001 probability level. Thus, genetic causes seem to imply to people a greater seriousness, tenacity, and pervasiveness or "spread" of the deviance. Predictions regarding behavioral orientation outcomes were only partially supported. Genetic attribution had no impact on social distance from the person with mental illness or on reproductive restrictiveness. Genetic attribution did, however, increase social distance from the mentally ill person's sibling, particularly with regard to intimate social distance, and this effect was partly mediated by genetic essentialist beliefs.
For the most part, the effects of genetic attribution were consistent across demographic groups. The only notable exception was for Asian Americans versus European Americans, where genetic attribution had a more pronounced effect on Asian Americans' reactions, substantially reducing blame and anger and increasing perceived risk to the sibling. This suggests Asian American attitudes may be more strongly influenced by the genetics revolution. However, the net effect with regard to stigma is not clear, because reduced blame and anger are destigmatizing outcomes, whereas an increased perception of risk for the sibling suggests an increase in associative stigma.
Two inherent limitations of the vignette experiment should be noted. First, vignettes describe specific scenarios. We presented two relatively severe mental illnesses that led to hospitalization because we wanted to observe the effects of genetic attribution on cases that would carry a significant "baseline" level of stigma. We described first episodes because we wanted to allow respondents to imagine what course the illness would take. These choices necessarily limit our ability to generalize. In particular, the effects of genetic attribution might differ for less severe forms of mental illness or illnesses that did not result in hospitalization, but stigma is also less of a concern in these cases. Second, respondents are confronted with a hypothetical situation, and only behavioral intentions, not actual behaviors, are measured. It is possible that real-life reactions to real people would differ from those observed in the vignettes. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to suppose that people's stated levels of social distance would have some bearing on their actual behavior. A third potential limitation shared by virtually all social research but perhaps especially noteworthy in this case concerns generalizability across time. The observed impact of genetic attribution on attitudes reflects notions the public currently hold about the meaning and implications of genetic causation. It is possible that, as the genetics revolution moves forward, a more complex and accurate understanding of genetics will be adopted by the public, and that in 10 years the same experiment would produce significantly different results.
An unexpected finding was that the three levels of genetic causation (genetic, partly genetic, and not genetic) were generally not monotonically related to the outcome measures. This suggests a more complicated relationship between genetic attribution and attitudes than I expected or than I can explain. A partly genetic explanation does not simply work like a weaker dose of a purely genetic explanation. This finding, combined with the fact that the partly genetic explanation was the one most likely to be accepted by respondents, suggests that the public's ideas about gene-environment interactions should be studied.
Because of the experimental design employed, the observed associations between genetic attribution and outcome variables cannot be attributed to confounding factors, and we can be confident that these associations reflect the causal impact of genetic attribution. Moreover, because the experiment was embedded in a nationally representative survey and because the findings, for the most part, held within demographic subgroups of the sample, we can conclude that the findings are reasonably representative of the adult U.S. population. Given the findings and the strengths and limitations of the study, the following conclusions are warranted.
CONCLUSIONS
Genetic attribution had its strongest and most consistent effects on a set of related beliefs about the seriousness of the mental illness and the degree to which it persists over time and transfers to biological relatives, beliefs that are consistent with the idea of genetic essentialism but that do not directly indicate stigma. Here I consider two questions: (1) Are these public beliefs consistent with common scientific beliefs? and (2) What is their bearing on stigma?
To what extent do perceptions that genetic causes increase severity, persistence, and transmissibility reflect common scientific beliefs about genetic influence, and to what extent do they reflect exaggerated beliefs indicative of "genetic essentialism?" Alper and Beckwith (1993) have convincingly argued that there is no necessary association between the degree of genetic influence on a behavior and the behavior's malleability or persistence. Regarding transmissibility, it is clear that genes transmit traits to offspring. However, environmentally determined traits such as wealth and choice of religion are also powerfully transmitted to offspring. Are genetically borne traits more transmissible than other traits, in general? This question is currently unanswerable. However, for the mental illnesses investigated in this article, particularly schizophrenia, twin and adoption studies indicate that more of the familial aggregation of the characteristic is due to genetic than to nongenetic familial factors (Kendler and Diehl 1993) . This suggests that respondents' reactions to the causal statements in the vignettes in part reflect perceptions that are congruent with current psychiatric research findings. However, studies of people undergoing genetic testing and counseling have found that individuals tend to overestimate the actual risk of developing a disease based on genetic profiles or family histories (Lerman et al. 1995; Evans et al. 1993 ). This suggests that public beliefs about the transmissibility of genetic characteristics are likely exaggerated by genetic essentialist thinking.
Finally, regardless of congruence with scientific thinking, it is important to consider the consequences of beliefs that genetic causes of a mental illness increase its seriousness, persistence, and transmissibility. As I have noted, they are not in themselves indicators of stigma. However, they have the potential to influence stigma indirectly by magnifying the perceived seriousness of the negatively labeled behavior and the firmness with which the label is attached to the person and his or her family. Is there evidence that these beliefs affect stigma? For the person with mental illness, the answer is no (a point to which I return below). For the person's sibling, however, these beliefs demonstrate their relevance to stigma by explaining a significant portion of the effect of genetic attribution on social distance.
Let us consider, finally, the overall impact of genetic attribution on direct indicators of stigma. Here we find significant but more modest effects and a situation that is somewhere between the worst fears of the pessimists and the best hopes of the optimists. One stigma outcome-the tendency to punish-was significantly reduced by a genetic causal attribution, and one-social distance from the sibling-was significantly increased. As noted earlier, the processes described by attribution theory and genetic essentialism are not mutually exclusive, and these findings support the idea that the effects of geneticization on stigma are complex, ameliorating stigma along some dimensions while exacerbating it along others. An important aspect of this complexity has to do with family relationship. In these results, the aspect of stigma that was reduced-punishmentaffected the person with the illness, whereas the aspect of stigma that was increased-social distance-affected the sibling. If two important consequences of geneticization are decreased blame and increased fear of genetic contamination, then geneticization may be most beneficial to parents and most harmful to younger relatives, such as siblings, children, and cousins of the ill person. Geneticization may absolve parents of causal responsibility, a benefit not likely to be shared by siblings or children who would not be held responsible for the illness under any causal explanation. Issues of genetic contamination are most salient for younger relatives, individuals who will be seeking mates and who may be seen as squarely in the risk period for developing the illness themselves. These issues are less problematic for parents.
For the person who actually bears the deviant status, issues of causal responsibility and genetic contamination may both be relevant. However, in this case, the effects of causal explanation may be largely overwhelmed by negative responses to the illness itself. Consistent with this possibility, social distance from the person with mental illness was nearly impervious to the manipulation of cause. However, social distance was strongly influenced by the type of disorder described in the vignette (schizophrenia, major depression, or ruptured disk). In addition, factors such as fear (reflecting perceptions of the behavioral manifestations of mental illness itself, not its causes) strongly influenced social distance and restriction (results not shown).
In conclusion, three findings are particularly noteworthy. First, the most prominent expectation about the consequences of geneticization is that it will reduce stigma, and public education campaigns and direct-to-consumer advertising currently promote the idea that mental illnesses are biologically based. The present findings do not confirm these positive expectations, and enthusiasm for this idea and practices based upon it should be reevaluated. Second, genetic attribution had strong effects on beliefs about persistence and transmissibility. Further research should explore the implications of these beliefs for a broader set of outcomes, including orientations to mental health treatment, genetic testing, and selective abortion, and for other stigmatized statuses. Research should also be specifically designed to assess the accuracy of these beliefs. Finally, in thinking about the impact of geneticization on stigma, it is essential to consider the whole family. The present findings indicate that the most harmful effects of geneticization are not for the individual with a deviant status but for family members who may never in their lives display the deviancy in question but who may nevertheless become tainted and rejected via a genetic connection to their stigmatized relative. NOTES 1. From a labeling theory perspective, the term "deviant" is not derogatory. Nevertheless, in common usage, the term has negative connotations. For this reason, I will usually employ the term "stigmatized" rather than "deviant." 2. Medicalization and geneticization are related but independent phenomena. Both involve movement away from moral definitions of stigmatized behavior, but genetic and medical definitions are not identical: Discovering genetic bases of sexual orientation would not imply that homosexuality is a medical condition (Conrad 2000) , and to define a behavior in medical terms does not imply that it is influenced by genetics. There is, however, a large overlap between medicalization and geneticization, especially with the strong focus of the HGP on illness. Moreover, many consequences of geneticization are likely to mirror those of medicalization, for example, the conditional legitimation of the stigmatized behavior, dislocation of responsibility, and the domination of expert control (Conrad and Schneider 1992). 3. The theory deals with three dimensions of causal attribution: controllability, stability, and locus. However, controllability is the dimension hypothesized to affect evaluative reactions to others, and this is the dimension that has been considered particularly relevant to the problem of stigma by both researchers and activists. 4. I restrict the meaning of the term "geneticization" to an increased tendency to define human characteristics in genetic terms and use "genetic essentialism" to describe the closely related ideas of genes as the basis for human identity and of genetic reductionism and determinism. 5. This idea is also consistent with attribution theory (Weiner 1995 Table 2 ). Genetic cause was not varied. 8. Because this selection modifies the random assignment of the independent variable and could introduce confounding factors, I did several checks. The only control variable that predicted retention in the final sample was younger age (p < .001). In the reduced sample, none of the control variables was significantly associated with the independent variable (genetic attribution), reducing concern about confounding factors. Finally, I repeated the analyses including all respondents regardless of recall or agreement status. 
